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Complementary Institutions and Reflexive Governance 
  
In Autonomous Social Law 
  
  
Introduction  
  
We approach institutions as stabilizing structures with consequences of functional 
incorporateness. Yet we also imagine, assert and enact claims and warrants as institutionalizable 
practices.  There are functional supports.  And there are the warranted claims of categorical 
normativity.  Normativity in itself can be understood in terms of compliance with or 
acquiescence in legitimating structures.  Yet normativity itself can be understood as a solidarism 
we intersubjectively co-constitute. The challenge in political thought has been dealing with the 
disincorporateness associated with modernity, specifically how a new order and dialogue may be 
of heterogeneous social values. A new way of ordering socioeconomic relationships of necessity 
must involve a heteronomy of perspectives and discourses in need of coordination.  All this 
revolves around a core conceptual challenge of the past century--the rise of the autonomous 
social in all its heteronomy, and its pluralist provocation to the sovereignty of either the State or 
the Market. 
  
Regimes of formality are constituted by historically determinate social practices and are related 
to a categorical transformation of socio-economic relationships. The governance of autonomous 
social law is such an emergent regime of formality. It constitutes itself as institutionalizing 
practice and as positive law that leave indelible traces as a self-constituting model of our 
subjectivity, ordering, rights, law and institutional justice. In its emergence, these new practices 
came to be known as complementary institutions. 
  
The governance of autonomous social law is the institutionalization of a governance rationale 
that both transcends and complements liberal institutions. It is law created by non-statist 
institutions which resist incorporation into a sovereign State. Governance is increasingly the 
concept used to refer to alternatives to state-centered law. Specifically, governance refers to the 
institutional capacity within self-regulating organizational networks of trust and reciprocity with 
significant autonomy from state governments. It refers to a strong undercurrent in legal practices 
associated with the labor law.  
This is a tradition of relational contracting and autonomous law-making that remains and reveals 
  
1.      alternative research paths to those of organized group access to policy-making 
      structures of governance that have characterized the neocorporatist practices of 
Keynesian Welfare State Democracy impasses of the 1970s; as well as 
  
2.      corrective understandings of how multipartite governance need not wind up in either 
vertical concertation and the subversion of the rule of law. 
  
Beyond the inter-individual prerogative contract of laissez-faire liberalism, there is the 
governance of autonomous social law--that is,  
  
       1. schemes of internal governance of collective constitutive contract based on multipartite 
consultations, bargaining and negotiation; and  
  
       2. the law of groups in the construction of autonomous‘ spheres (or subsystems) of 
deliberate self-regulation.   
  
At work alongside this emergent regime of formality is a critical sociology of law understood as 
a dialectic of formality and solidarity that lead to emergent institutional complementarity and a 
semblance of deliberative democracy. 
  
Amidst the increasing collaborative institutional ecologies in the parallel development of global 
capitalism, there is a vital undercurrent and sophisticated strategy of labor law. This is an 
unfolding the Philip Selznick (1969) saw as rooted in the ways contract and association have 
moving away from the traditional contract of individual prerogative as organizations. This is an 
unfolding pattern of institutionalized interactions would become central to economic and legal 
sociology, as John R, Commons, Harold Laski and the Weimar era critical sociologists had noted 
earlier in the twentieth century. This is an unfolding of self-organizing forms of reflexive law and 
reflexive governance separate from the logics of market nor hierarchy, and what is referred to as 
heterarchy -- a cybernetic term sociologized over the last two decades by Guenther Teubner and 
David Stark.  (See for example, Stark, 2000 and Teubner, 2003/04). 
  
We are witnessing in our epoch of globalized capitalism the emergence, formulation, 
codification and monitoring of transnational conventions, standards and rules that come to 
function as constituted supervening norms. This is a norm elaboration increasingly negotiated by 
non-state actors. Again, this is a legal subjectivity of codes and protocols linked to a mutuality of 
being in an on-going concern, and extended by a pluralism of standard-setting procedures that 
develop conditional relations of trust beyond the traditional two person relationship of contract. 
Our understanding of contract is extended – from its original transactional sense into a relational 
sense, metamorphosed into a network of relational contracts intermeshed and operating 
recursively with its plural contextures and colliding discourses. With the proliferation of 
normatizing networks, there comes a need for effective interfaces, interoperability and 
complementarity. These autonomous non-statist associational networks multi-laterally regulate 
both intra-organizational and inter-organizational conflicts that emerge both within national 
bounds and which increasingly cross national borders. 
  
We are challenged to represent a polycontextuaral sense of institutional complementarity  in the 
reflexive self-organization of  civil society associations.  (See for example,Teubner           ). This 
is an institutional framework within which seemingly incommensurable and colliding discourses 
can be regulated, if not reconciled. ( See also Robert Boyer,                       )   This is an unfolding 
institutional assemblage of negotiating social partners in a complex and heterogeneous network, 
rather than an ordering of holders of sovereign authority within hierarchy. 
  
 
I.  Network Institutionalism: Beyond NeoPluralism and NeoCorporatism 
  
Our touchstone is the proliferation of norm creation and legal regulation that shifts away from 
the public ordering of formal law-making by government toward the processes of autonomous 
self-regulation outside government control, referred to as governance.  A significant concern 
becomes the extent to which these emergent subsystems of social regulation become 
operationally autonomous from the organizing and steering principles of state selectivity with 
regard to the regulation of the capital accumulation process (Jessop    , Boyer     ) 
  
From the framework that has been the governance of autonomous spheres of law evolves a 
relentless functional differentiation that results in autonomous self-regulatory/self-legitimating 
procedural subsystems as new modes of juridical fields (Bourdieu            ) and new modes of 
Social Partnership (Ebbinghaus, 2006).  These amount to a multi-level governance of a complex 
pluralism that goes beyond the deal-making athleticism of an interest group liberalism outside 
the rule of law known as neopluralism; as well as beyond the encapsulating and exclusionary 
neocorporatist practices of concertation, pillarization and tripartite consultation. 
  
This is a reflexive multi-level governance that is decentered and more horizontally or 
heterarchically iter-linked 
  
                     resisting centralized coordination; 
                     resisting dirigiste administrative colonization of the economy; 
                     resisting a single universalist value system or form of life; and 
                     resisting conceptions of either an ontologically privileged class or  
  institutional substance. 
  
The relentlessly emergent autonomous social subsystems constitute both a normed pluralism and 
a complex pluralism that transcends both traditional principal/agent approaches as well as 
twentieth century interpretations of pluralism.  From the governance of autonomous social law to 
the deliberate self-regulation of autonomous social subsystems, we are confronted with both 
historically contingent institutionalizing practices and an on-going epistemic subject based on 
pragmatic understandings.  Such practices and epistemic subject serve as bearers of new claims 
and warranted assertions that fit with recursively reorganizing modes of interest intermediation 
as well as the reciprocal coordination and recursive referentiality of autonomous social 
subsystems that leads to procedural contextualization. 
  
Chris Ansell (2006) uses the term network institutionalism to stress the need to comprehend 
policy-making behavior contextually, especially where institutional complementarity, 
interweaving, interdiscursivity and interconnectivity generate strong norms of mutual obligation 
and reciprocity.  Ansell (76-77) notes how Granovetter (1985) stressed a social network 
approach to avoid 
  
                   either a completely norm-determined (overly-sociologized) perspective   
              or an interest group determined (under-sociologized) perspective; 
  
                   either a market or a hierarchical approach. 
Network institutionalism as a stepped up constructivism enables us to heed the argumentative 
turn in policy analysis with a focus on discursive committedness itself, rather than merely the 
application of the commitment of others.  This is an interpretivist focus on how we create normic 
statements and practices; and reflexively critique the institutionalizing practical reason behind 
them.  Agency and material interests are seen as context - - dependent. 
  
Beyond the application of sedimented discursive strategies that come to be taken for granted 
(e.g., Hay, Schmidt) we need a focus on representing the interpretations by which new discourse 
and institutions are constructed endogenously within a field of practical reason (e.g., Ansell, 
Bevir,            ) - - one that leads to critical evaluation of the truthfulness of justice of such newly 
constructed discourse and institutional practice. 
Ansell‘s network-oriented approach recognizes the necessity for argumentative strategies to 
work their way out both inter-organizationally and at multiple levels of governance.  Ansell‘s 
network institutionalism (NI) further recognizes the complementarity in heterarchy, rather than 
the pyramid quality of hierarchy.  NI also understands that like markets, networks operate 
without central direction and according to rules of exchange.  Nonetheless, unlike markets, 
network interactions are more diffuse than discrete, and more social than impersonal.  In contrast 
to markets, normative commitments and commitedness are important (Ansell,1997-2000). 
Following Frank Nullmeier (2006), we an distinguish two types of non-hierarchical networks:  
bargaining regimes and argumentation networks.  The former allows for heterarchy, but 
participation can be limited to a few exclusive participating actors whose preferred knowledge 
form is the generated managerial expertise as discourse.  The extent of recognition of 
participants and their discourse is the main characteristic, as is an emphasis on allocation 
privileges rather than on participatory rights. 
Bargaining regime is a term used by David Kettler (              ) to characterize the Social 
Partnership relations and rapports associated with both neopluralism and neocorporatism as well 
as the statistic integration of labor.  (In the U.S., e.g., the Wagner Labor Relations Act of 1935).  
Bargaining regimes inclusive of social partnership forms like advisory councils, works councils, 
codetermination and quangos tend to justify demands within a discourse of generally 
accepted/credible norms, consensus bound norms rather than consensus projecting ones. 
Argumentation networks encourage participant negotiating actors to persuade each other of the 
validity and justifiability of their warranted assertions.  They do so within generalizable norms, 
rather than generally accepted conventions.  They do so knowing they can pursue their claim‘s 
immanent justifiability, in terms of broader concepts of social justice. 
Networks serve as enduring relations and institutional frameworks of negotiated interaction 
among a plurality of interdependent yet operationally autonomous actors (Sorenson and Torfing, 
2007:  10, 26/27).  Further, networks  
  
                   are not based on the sameness, but on the complementarity of  
             heterogeneous elements 
                   exhibit ―bounded rationality‖ in enduring fundamental values within 
             which internal negotiations can take place; 
                    are incessantly creating and transforming codes and protocols defining 
             them; 
                   exhibit an awareness of and responsiveness to emergent effects of their  
             network interactions; 
                   confront the limits of network range in confronting other autonomous  
             social subsystems; and 
                   need to be coordinated and ―structurally coupled‖ to maximize their    
             contribution to larger issues of socio-economic justice and ordering  
             beyond their own domain. 
Network governance both characterizes and renews an increasingly complex pluralism. 
  
  
II. A Vital Undercurrent in Comparative Labor Law 
  
A critical sociology of law developed along  paths ploughed by Harold Laski in Britain and 
America before the Second World War, as well as by the Weimar Republic Era Labor Lawyers, 
(eg., Herman Heller 1927;cf. Caldwell; Dyzeahaus); Franz Neumann, (1942; 1986/1
st
 published 
1936) and Otto Kahn-Freund (1970 a, 1970b, 1976, 1981).  
  
This argumentative strand of social democracy critically describes an evolution- within the husk 
of capitalist private and public law--of  postliberal conceptions of governmentality, institutional 
justice and jurisprudence wherein contract and  private property rights are adapted to a sense of 
constitutional reordering of the economy and society.  Such evolution is rooted in the collective 
constitutive contracts and multipartite consultations and bargaining that characterize what the 
political sociologist Gerhard Lehmbruch (1998) defines as ―Negotiated Democracy.‖ 
  
Laski and the Weimar labor lawyers keep us aware of the importance of both practice and 
juridification in institutionalizing a regime of the Autonomous Social – uncoupled from the 
State, yet linked through complementary institutions with civil society as a new form of live – 
that is,  a new governmentality.  Such practice and institutionalizing reflect the discursive 
struggles of pluralist Social Subjects of Rights, rather than a monist Hegelian-Marxist notion of a 
Social Subject of Right. Their focus was on the law creating capacity of autonomous collective 
associations. They shape their own autonomous domains heteronomously. They institutionalize 
collective rationalities – institutionally separated, but recursively and complementarily connected 
to each other. The governance of social law derives from collegial institutional forms of 
association, as noted from Otto von Gierke a century ago, through F.W. Maitland and Harold 
Laski in the early twentieth century, down to Guenther Teubner today.  This is a form embedded 
in different genres of discourse and practice, with immanent capacity of blossoming into an 
integral concrete institutional order. Teubner has followed his social law predecessors at the 
London School of Economics, Laski, Otto Kahn Freund and Lord Wedderburn; and continues 
this critical sociology of law focus  non-oligarchic horizontal coordination as heterarchy.  This 
amounts to a pluralization of deliberative democracy within the autonomous law-making. 
   
This tradition of institutional logic does not start with a system of natural rights preceding human 
association, rather it starts with a pluralist tradition of consociates constructing forms of 
intersubjective sociality.  This institutionalizing tradition reflects a century of liberation from 
traditional forms of solidarity--including mutual benefit and local insurance communities.  It has 
been a century in which the limits of liberalism became apparent in its inability to either provide 
social security or to maintain or generate social solidarity in the face of disincorporated social 
relations.  Social law came to include poor law, education law, family law, social insurance law, 
and social services law -- in addition to labor law.  All provocatively confront the concept of 
private property as the core ordering principle. 
  
Peter Caldwell (               )  notes that the term Social Rechtsstaat (Sozialer Rechtsstaat) was a 
term used by Hermann Heller; and that it is best translated into English as the Rule of Social 
Law--or the Governance of Social Law--rather than the ―Social Rule of Law‖ State.  The social 
law tradition and concept of Social Rechtsstaat captures best the approach of Hugo Sinzheimer 
(1875-1945).  Making use of  the Genossenchaft theory of Otto Gierke, Sinzheimer challenged 
the ―concession theory‖ of legal groups of German positive and Roman law.  Like Frederick 
Maitland, John Figgis, and Harold Laski in England, Sinzheimer argued that social groups are 
―organic entities,‖ autonomously capable of willing and acting rather than legally fictitious 
personalities as they were understood under Roman law.  These authentic group personalities 
make their own rules--what  Gierke called ―social law.‖  Collective bargaining agreements fit 
this new category.  Gierke‘s theory meant that labor unions as well as employer associations 
were legitimate groups with rights and duties.  These groups could speak through their own 
organs in ways determined by their own internal rules, that is, their own substantive rationality.  
Not only within one‘s own particular group but between groups, such social law takes legal 
priority over the simple individual labor contract. 
  
Hermann Heller (1891-1933), like Neumann, would come under the wing of Harold Laski.  He 
championed the idea of the Social Rechtsstaat in the sense of the socializing of the Rechtsstaat 
idea and its institutionalizing practice.  Heller understood the Social Rechtsstaat as a process of 
the democratization of reason, a conceptualized process which replaced the idea of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat--as the meaning constitutive human activity which continually 
shapes the normativity of the social lifeworld as institutional facts. 
  
Heller understood how institutions traditionally associated with the Rechtsstaat idea and 
practices of liberalism could be given a new and broader social base.  A Social Rechtsstaat was 
in the interest of the bourgeoise whose concern was with security of both contract and property 
with certainty; and in the interest of the proletariat intent on developing social claims of 
opportunity, protection and participation.  There was a Laski-like pluralist emphasis on the 
organized collectivities of civil society, and on an awareness of a possible new civic culture of 
enabling group rights. 
  
Heller came to understand concepts such as the ―governance of social law‖ and Social 
Rechtsstaat as middle range concepts that refer back to broader shared regulative values of social 
democratic justice as they are credibly applied in practice.  He stressed an internal connection 
between a sociological approach and the reasoning drawn from theories of justice. 
  
Immanently posed as a focus not only on autonomous spheres of justice, but how they could be 
coupled or coordinated in a process suffused by democracy and ―the rule of law.‖ 
  
The governance of social law came to be understood as a genre of collegial institutional forms 
within civil society wherein forms of sociability and solidarity are channeled 
  
1.      without nostalgic gild attachments: and 
2.      without a syndicalist fascination (or ―prophylaxis‖ to quote Robert Michels) with 
the simplicity of the workers councils/communities (Arbeitsrate). 
  
Sinzheimer along with Hugo Preuss--the draftsman of the Weimar Republic Constitution--helped 
break the backbone of the Luxembourgian (Arbeitsrate) with the institutionalizing of works‘ 
communities (Betriebsrate) with a program of protocolism, arbitration and joint decision-
making--later supplemented in 1972 by co-determination on corporate boards (Mitbestimmung).  
More recently, the consultative councils in the Netherlands play a similar role as the 
Betriebsrate.  All operate as complementary institutions--complementary and parallel with rights 
of property and contract. 
  
Carl Schmitt had noted in ―Freiheitsrechte und Institutionelle Guarantien der Reichsverfassung‖ 
(1931) and ―Grundrechte und Grundpflichten (1932) that the Weimar Constitution and the 
Weimar Era generated a new constitutional category of institutional guarantees which surpassed 
the traditional protection of individual liberties, e.g., private property; marriage and family; the 
right to inheritance; and added the autonomy of the municipalities and of the universities and of 
independent works unions.  Included in the section of the Weimar Constitution on Basic Rights 
were not only the classic liberal formalistic guarantees, but in addition and alongside were as 
well programmatic statements of social rights to education, freedom and property which help us 
transcend social inequality so as to assure the enjoyment of the primordial liberal rights.  These 
were constitutionally-based guarantees of the State‘s responsibility to create a 
protective environment of institutionalized procedures to promote and secure the Basic (Liberal) 
Rights.  Ironically, the fascist corporatism initially espoused in Schmitt‘s analysis contributed to 
the growing recognition of these new guarantees of institutional roles and protections, necessary 
to enable Basic Rights. These auxiliary rights are seen as promises rather than Basic Rights by 
such leading statute positivist interpreters of the Weimar popular sovereignty beyond the 
definition of sovereignty offered by Hobbes. 
              
Neumann‘s Weimar Republic work in labor and social law – influenced by Carl Schmitt--
focused on the legal formulations of institutional guarantees (institutionalle Garantien) as 
complementary guarantees (Konnexgarantian), and as complementary institutions 
(Konnexinstitut), associated with the freedom of association.  (Neumann, 1932: 86-88, 116-119.)  
Neumann saw the collective contract of labor law resulting from collective bargaining and what 
would come to be called Codetermination (Mitbistimmung) as complementary institutions 
serving as the bearers of a social democratic interpretation of law.  The complementary 
institutions were understood in monopoly capitalism within national boarders as cartels and 
counter-balancing trade unions, anticipating the transnational corporations, transnational labor 
confederations, and international nongovernmental organization of contemporary global 
capitalism.  The complementary institutions come to force into the background the ―principal 
institutions‖ such as the partnership, firm and individual prerogative contract that they were 
originally intended to augment and serve through auxiliary legal interpretations and institutional 
practices. (Neumann, 1930.) 
  
The related problematics of the governance of social law and complementary institutions are 
further differentiated in the effect of regional frameworks such as the European Union (EU), in 
state regime forms such as the Rechtsstaat or the Sozialstaat.  The differentiation changes the 
appropriate normative-empirical frame of reference.  EU practices of coordination of member 
nation policies  -- OMC/ ‖Open Method of Coordination‖ -- and related transnational 
―comitological‖ policymaking under the auspices of the European Commission create ―multiple 
policy Europes.‖ Such a two or three tiered EU, referred to as a Sektoral Staat wherein social 
policy, social rights and law must be complemented on a EU level to deal with market-correcting 
consequences of globalization and European regionalism.  (See MacCormick 2007; cf. 
Schmitter, 2000 and Scharpf, 1999.)  State regime forms have to be adapted in order to guarantee 
social policy and social rights and law, increasingly affected by what we will refer to as 
transnational networks of enterprise that divide up the globe and regions of it in heterarchical 
sectors.  See Figure 1. 
  
Figure 1 below summarizes genealogies of the critical sociology of law inferred from the vital 
undercurrents in comparative labor law and the law of associations.  This summary framework of 
genealogies also contextuates the development of the issues of the governance of social 
law/reflexive governance that ensues in the sections that follow. 
  
  
GENEALOGIES OF A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 
  
Droit social/Solidarité                       Kant (Rechtstaat)                                               Marx 
                      Duguit                                                                                          Hegel (Rechtstaat &                                                            Renner 
                      Hauriou                                                                                                  Sittlichkeit)                                                                  H. Preuss 
                        Kurkheim                                                                                                                                                                                       (Weimar constitution) 
                        Gurvitch                                  Weber (Anstalt:  institutional                 Sinzheimer 
                                                                                                  theory of associations) 
  
Theory of Pluralism 
                Maitland               legal personality of                                              Jhering (institutionalist                                                    Schmitt 
                Laski                     association &                                                       theory of law                                                                       (institutional 
                                                social rights                                                           Gierke  (theory of natural                                               substance) 
                                                                                                                                              law of associations) 
  
R.M. MacIver                      R. Miliband                           K. Mannheim                                                       Weimar Labor Law Legacy                           Luhmann 
                                                P. Hirst                                 (sociology                                                               Kirchheimer                                                         (systems 
                                                L. Panitch                              of knowledge)                                                     H. Heller                                                                analysis) 
                                                                                                                                    Neumann 
                                                                                                                                                                                Kahn-Freund 
                                                                                Critical Theory of Society                
                                                                                   (Adorno & Horkheimer)                                  Lord Wedderburn 
Law of Associations                                                                 Habermas 
& Corporate Governance                                                                                                                                                                                                     Teubner                                 
                                                                                                                                                                     Neil MacCormick &                                          D. Zolo 
S. Leader                                                   New Deal Legacy                                                                Ota Weinberger                                                  Latour 
M. Roe                                                            John R. Commons &                                                    (institutional theory                                           theories of 
P. Gourvetich &                                            Philip Selznick                                                                 of law/normative                                            complexity, 
J. Shinn                                                         (old institutionalism)                                                       institutionalism)                                                 polycontexturality 
                                                                  Adolphe Berle                                                                                                                                       & networks 
                                                                        Lon Fuller 
                                                                        David Truman                                                                                              Kritische Justiz 
                                                                        William Simon, David Stark                                                                        U. Preuss                              
                                                                                                                    & Charles Sabel (heterarchy)                                                                      Alexy, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  B. Peters 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  K. Gunther                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                                  Joerges 
                                                                         
                            
III.  Laski-Schmitt Aporetics on the Possibility of the Social 
  
Aporia:  the experience of a non-passage before a threshold.   
  
Aporetic knots present us with a condition of impossibility and possibility.   
  
Aporias reveal impasses and the step related to the path beyond.   
  
Aporetic paradoxes posed theoretically seven decades ago by Carl Schmitt and his egalitarian 
opponent Harold Laski persist as the most important in the past century regarding alternatives to 
sate-centered law, and the extent to which private law making is not only beyond state law, but 
commercial law as well, revealing what Leon Duguit—following Rudolf von Jhering--referred to 
as ―the law of purpose‖ and indeed social law, reflecting social solidarity as an intact substance 
of collective will, rather than an aggregate of individual consciences.  Aporias are puzzles that 
can reveal the promise of discourse, not un-bridgeable antinomies. 
  
―Laski-Schmitt aporetics‖ propel our thinking toward a non-statist law-making that represents 
path-shaping rather than patterned path dependency.  At the root of both thinkers‘ work is the 
related coupling of ―complementary institutions‖ and ―institutional complementarity.‖  This 
coupling has emerged as a central motif in present day arguments from both historical 
institutionalism and rational choice theory.  But significantly in rethinking social democracy, it is 
no longer a phenomena within national borders.  This critical coupling now ghosts transnational 
nonstatist law and regulation.  A plurality of nonstatist networks has emerged where state 
governments cannot steer directly.  These complex networks are bounded not by territory, but by 
functionality, communicative codes, and particular practices.  These networks anticipate what 
Ann-Marie Slaughter refers to as the ―decentered form of global governance and cosmopolitan 
law.‖  Beyond Laski‘s own focus on protecting labor and social rights from the vicissitudes of 
monopolization, the problematics of sovereignty  and complementary institutions needs  to be 
appreciated both endogenously as well as exogenously within an internal rules jurisprudence 
both within borders and beyond. 
  
Carl Schmitt tantalizes the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) Movement with its decinstructivist 
emphasis on the rule of law as ideology. This differs diametrically from the Critical Sociology of 
Law tradition with its constructivist calling to institutionalize in legal practice deliberative or 
negotiated democracy.  There is Schmitt‘srecognition of normative indeterminacy.  How we ask 
do we participate in norms in age of disincorporateness, non-Euclidian geometry and a physics 
that defies a stable unifying Kantian system?  The law is seen as unavoidably indeterminate in its 
meaning and its application; it is no longer derivable from natural law, and seems robbed of its 
authoritative substance for meaningful guidelines.  Is there a consequent of any semblance of 
determinancy in a pluriverse of incommensurable subjecivites and ideologies, rendering all 
things equivalent?  Can we fill the voids and close the gaps left by the letter of the law in such an 
age of pluralism? 
  
Schmitt invites a post-liberal governmentality, and before the 1930s searched for a concrete 
institutionalist order that overcame liberalism on the pattern of Gierke‘s Genossenschafslehre 
studies of medieval guilds and associations.  Schmitt searched for an institutional order capable 
of forming a concrete order of substance beyond the de-soulded and vulnerable liberal state 
neutrality.  He saw liberalism as creating (1) a society which desperately requires a sovereign 
decision, but seeks at every point to postpone or prevent such a decision from being made; and 
(2) a system of democracy within which interest groups can impose their values on others if they 
capture governmental power.  Every political institution, argued Schmitt, is specifically intended; 
each with a particular principle on which it rests, and which must be the criterion of institutional 
legitimacy.  But Schmitt‘s anti-liberalism amounts to  (1) almost agnostic reflections on the 
disappearance of soul and substance--a Sorelian affirmative mythic substance – enabling us to be 
treated equally; and (2) ultimately the retrieval of a prefigurative sacral ordering rather than in 
creating open future-oriented ones--as well as a state separate from society, yet keeping the latter 
in check.  Order/ordering is seen as creating norms and rules, rather than vice versa. 
  
Like his great foil of that era Harold Laski, Schmitt was pushed from the institutional ordering 
provocation of pluralism toward statism--both for opposite reasons in confronting egalitarianism 
and its fascist containment.  Both remain ironically linked.  Both wondered whether equality and 
social rights, rather than property and private rights, are affirmations of the concrete substance of 
popular sovereignty and post-liberal governmentality.  But whereas Schmitt turned toward an 
instinctive homogeneous General Will, Laski worked for a socially constructivist/heterogenous 
one.  Both understood the eclipse of state sovereignty that the earliest years of the Weimar 
Republic foretold, as an autonomous network of negotiated democracy/social compact rather 
than a state per se was emerging.  Contrary to Laski‘s Rousseauian disposition, Schmitt saw 
political theory as one endless footnote to the Leviathan.  Contrary to Schmitt‘s unitary purpose 
and mystical communal indwellingness, Laski searched for the passage to a Legal 
Order/ordering found in the pluriverse of social reality, which men and women make for 
themselves as the social subject[s] or right[s] in their private associations and their transaction, 
as well as in their social solidarity and its consequent labor law and social law. 
  
For Laski, the vital query was how legal forms emerged reflecting the nature of negotiated 
democracy.  Specifically, this is the autonomous law made by collective organizations 
(heterarchy) and not state-centered regimes (hierarchy).  This is what Philip Selznick (1997) 
referred to as the constituting of a scheme of inner governance of regulative institutional 
practices--reflecting a community of discursive commitments, possessing an inner legality.  This 
is a vital--if latent--undercurrent according to Laski‘s LSE descendent and successor to Otto 
Kahn-Freund, Lord Wedderburn: a decentered discursive tradition of institutions and practices 
rather than external standards of justification tied to collective labor law, adapting property rights 
to social/mutual ordering.  This autonomous law is not the object of pure cognition, but the 
values that the trade union and social democracy movements commit themselves to--as 
warranted assertions of a postliberal juridico-discursive order.  Schmitt‘s challenge is to find a 
concrete postliberal institutional order, that the State cannot be a mere battleground for different 
interest groups which can impose their own values.  Schmitt cannot do so without an appeal to 
religion and tradition; and without pushing a de-formalization regarding the gap between norm 
and concrete case.  He emphasizes normless will to replace the will-less norm associated with the 
Hans Kelsen‘s pure normativism.  This de-formalist/anti-formalist communitarianism of the Volk 
attracts Leftist CLS (especially Unger) with its simplistic value of community over form.  Yet its 
aestheticism ignores the way many corporations take advantage of deformalized environmental 
law by controlling expert discussion.  
  
Laski skirted around the syndicalism of Duguit and the functional corporatism of Durkheim, by 
aligning with the pluralism of William James and the progressive constitutionalism of Justices 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter.  He resisted aspects of the Marxist tradition: 
  
1.      the determinist/instrumentalist approach to the legal, the normative, and the 
institutional as mere superstructure; and 
2.      the theory of the proletariat as a theory of the proletariat. 
  
Instead, he recognized the reality of social, cultural and political pluralism and with it 
  
1.      the emergence of private alternative governance regimes moving away from the 
traditional theories of the individual prerogative contract and private property;  
2.      What went with this development, a phenomenon Gunther Teubner likes to label 
today as ―the collision of legal regimes.‖ 
  
Rather than a theory of the historical agency of the proletariat as the Social Subject of Rights, 
Laski infers the Social Subject[s] of Right[s] as the engine of Rousseauian popular sovereignty 
and its law-making function.  
  
Schmitt distinguished between 19
th
 century liberalism and 20
th
 century democracy.  Yet rather 
than a Democratic Rechtsstaat based on reflexivity and proceduralism within institutional 
spheres, he offers a model of a strong state which cancelled out civil society‘s own independence 
and the social dilemmas it generates. Schmitt eschews the Rechtssaat tradition of Kant and 
Hegel as well as the British ‗Rule of Law‖ commitment championed by Laski--as well as Barker 
and Maitland--and which drew the interest of Neumann and Kahn-Freund.  Instead, Schmitt 
looked for a release from the fetters of Kelsen-like normativism and proceduralism, with 
enabling acts that increase the discretionary power of the Executive and negates the emergent 
negotiated democracy of interest group associations, professional societies, corporations, and 
trade unions.  The political was unavoidable for Schmitt, who was determined to save the state 
from socialism and cosmopolitanism, from the politics of deadlock/gridlock and immanent civil 
war, from the penetration of the State by worm-like civil society association--from a normativist 
set of procedures on global regulation of commerce and human rights, which lack pouvoir 
constituent. 
  
Laski and Neumann and the tradition they spawned suggests a pluralism which placed the source 
of rights outside and prior to the State.  Such a pluralism is one of the democratizing social 
subjects(s) of rights(s) realizing generalizability of rules and egalitarian impulses which might 
not founder on the rocks of national sovereignty. 
  
The Laski -Neumann rapport resists Schmitt‘s politically oriented law, and sense of 
―institutional justice‖ which  
1. does not tolerate formalism;  
2. does not accept a disaggregation of sovereignty or multiple legal regimes and new forms 
of rule creation;  
3. does not welcome multiple perspectives, interpretations, and participation in questioning 
the legitimacy of legality itself; and  
4. which is antagonistic to the Wilhelmine notion of a Koordinationsrecht where each 
sovereign has its realm and a state coordinates the plural regimes of regulatory and 
legislative authority.  (See here Gunther Teubner: ―‘Global Bukowina;‘ Legal Pluralism 
in the World Society,‖ and ―Societal Constitutionalism:  Alternatives to State--Centered 
Constitutional Theory.‖ )  
  
Laski presents sovereignty not as imperium, but as formalized voluntarism.  He positions the 
crucial queries of democratic legitimacy taken up by Jurgen Habermas and his students regarding 
the democratic institutionalizing of internal rules jurisprudence--and what goes along with it, a 
theory of institutional justice with a related political sociology of institutional normativism.  This 
enabled him to gauge the disintegration of private property relations, the transformation of 
contract law, and the growing extent of both overlapping legal forms and the lucrative practice in 
―conflict of laws.‖ 
  
Laski suggested a third revolution in sovereignty--beyond Hobbes‘ and Locke‘s property 
securing accounts.  His legal analyses in the teens and the twenties anticipate the accelerating 
movement for universal human rights and the need for transnational economic regulation.  These 
also anticipate the emerging transnational regulations coming from nation states, transnational 
private actors and nongovernmental organizations as a ratio juris undergirding a mutually willed 
normativism, rather than a coalition of the norm-less willing sovereigns. 
  
Lord Wedderburn himself in ―Laski‘s Law Behind the Law:  1906 to European Law‖ (R. 
Rawlings, ed. Law, Society and Economy, Oxford:  1997) notes how remarkably Laski foresaw 
the drift toward de-regulation of commercial enterprise.  Further, Wedderburn shows how 
Laski‘s own work started with his analysis of judicial creativity in interpreting the common law--
as in the 1901 decision of Taff Vale Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants--could 
overturn legislated/posited labor law and the mutual orderings of complementary institutions of 
conflict regulation they overturn.  Laski, argues Wedderburn, represents the need to oust the 
common law behind the alternative labor/social law; and would work to defend and sustain the 
institutional complementarity of European Union Labor law and social law, the Social Charter of 
the Protocols of Maastricht, the Conventions of the International Labor Organization, and the 
European Convention for Protection of Human Rights. 
  
Unfortunately, In Laski‘s leadership of the Labour Party Campaign of 1945 and his collectivist 
turn during the War Against Fascism, he regressed to a view of the state as the only vehicle to 
restrict private greed.  While this undercut of the enduring force of his scholarship, it does not 
demean it.  In rethinking social democracy, we need not only retrieve, but more critically redeem 
his pioneering work on alternative forms of autonomous law. 
  
  
 
 
 IV. From Plurality to Complexity 
  
  
We go beyond Laski‘s theories of pluralist ordering of a new heterogeneous social democracy as 
a counter to Schmitt‘s reordering along notions of homogeneous nationalism/racialism.  There is 
an emerging interrelated sociological theory of heterarchy and networks.  These are the 
enduring patterns of large scale interaction among heterogeneous social actors constituted by 
relational contracts and shared protocols with coordinating norms, values and practices.  
Compared to hierarchies, the individual components in a network are more autonomous--
bidirectional and multilateral rather than characterized by vertical integration.  Conflicts are 
settled by negotiations referring to commonly agreed to benchmarking delineated in protocols. 
  
Heterarchies/Networks are constituted by relational contracts and the connected contracts 
spelling out the multilateral self-regulation structures that secure the network with norms of 
reciprocity and relational purpose.  These internal structures of legal review facilitate juridical 
mediation, arbitrations, correction and development of the latest interaction of collective 
contracting with institutional guarantees for organized participants in these autonomous networks 
(or sectors). 
  
Polycontexturality combines heterarchy with a need for coordinating the resolution of the 
colliding autonomous subsystemic regime logics of each network/heterarchy (or sector).  
(Teubner 2002; 2003/04a.)  Teubner uses the concept of polycontexturality to account for the 
necessary recognition of each organizational node of a network of the related autonomous 
regimes that affects it or could affect it; as well as to build on the concept of ―institutional 
guarantees‖ for the autonomy of the complementary institutional nodes of networks. 
  
Guenther Teubner poses polycontexturality as the response to the fragmentation of our modern 
society into a plurality of self-constituting contextures of conflict regulation and self-limitation.  
Society exists only in the mutual recognition of the blindspot that comes from one‟s own 
contexture, and that a unified noncontextural perspective (pace Schmittian homogeneity)is 
unavailable.  There are plural modes of discourse, and frames of reference.  These contextures 
emerge as codes and programs of internal governance beyond representative state apparata, 
transcending the traditional binaries of State/civil society and public law/private law.  
Polycontexturality enables the overburdened private law subsystem reflecting social 
differentiation/fragmentation to respond to the particularities of institutional contextures within 
civil society as well as to the colliding discursive regimes they engender.  How can private law 
regimes calibrate their conflict regulation procedures to the plurality of discourse regimes?  
Beyond the affirmation of diversity, there is the need to protect the complexity/differentiation of 
the global network society Manual Castells describes as being constituted by the space of capital 
and information flows. 
  
We can detect a four state mutual development in the advanced industrial societies, as the chart 
that follows summarizes. 
   
                        Types of pluralism                                           types of social rights 
  
          Pluralism I: the web of multiple                                    1. the right to association 
          Voluntary associations 
  
          Pluralism II: interest group liberalism                           2. rights to social protection 
          Centered around a Keynesian welfare state                       enabling assistance 
  
          Pluralism III: the flowering of diversity/                       3. rights of peoples re:   
          Multiculturalism                                                                their culture and language 
                                                                                                              
          Pluralism IV: the complexity of cybernetic                  4. rights of peoples re:        
          Information flows                                                              system complexity 
  
Teubner‘s polycontexturality approach conceptualizes an emergent ―heterarchical‖ yet 
institutionally complementary and interconnected network –type linkage at the level of 
organizations and professions.  Teubner looks to a multiplicity of subsystemic subconstitutions, 
where private law is constitutionally constrained to take of its diverse social systemic context 
(hence polycontexturality).  Danielo Zolo (1992),  adds a new level of social rights--the rights of 
complexity, the right to preserve practices/processes necessary for social systems to retain 
pattern maintenance.  These can be ethnic of linguistic, community or neighborhood based, 
craftsman or expert based. 
  
Following Charles Sabel, we can take our lead from the attempted countervailing globalization 
of information flows and advocacy campaigns around labor/social rights and human rights.  
Specifically, we note how such countervailing power are pressuring multinational corporations 
(MNCs) and multinational nongovernmental organizations NGO to adopt labor and social 
standards and to set up evaluation and monitoring protocols with a schedule of enforceable 
sanctions.  In many ways this paper poses a sociology of rights and law approach to the creation 
of a New New Deal to regulate globalized capitalism. 
  
Under conditions of globalization, autonomous governance regimes increase.  At the same time 
they lose political mediation by the State.  Sites of decentered discourse and decentralized law 
are extended.  An environment of complexity grows with a cascading amount of choices, 
differentiated subsystems.  As the level of decentralization grows there grows a complexity of 
plural logics, and the more interdependent the variables become (Zolo: 3-7).  A higher order of 
plurality grows one that involves not just the mutual recognition of otherness, but a recognition 
of the plurality of discursive logics within global society and the need for some interdiscursivity 
of colliding rationalities.  This is a hetarchy of logical domains.  Luhmann, in The Differentiation 
of Society (1982), noted this plurality of logical domains, which--following Gotthard Gunther 
(1982, 1985) and Warren McColloch (1945) before him--he labeled contextures.  Within 
institutional contextures specific codes emerge to help provide transjuctional operations of 
plurality, rather than operations of simple binaries.  These are codes for interdiscursivity and 
mutual learning.  They are not guided by a prefigurative or prestabilized harmony, as hinted by 
Carl Schmitt. 
  
In this higher order of plurality correlative to globalization -- heterarchies of discourse specific 
norms and institutional contextures--call for a new form of governance.  This is one with a sense 
of complementarity necessary to bring together seemingly incommensurable and conflicting 
explanatory systems/perspectives/rationale.  This is a non-linear complementarity: a circular 
organization on the pattern of neural networks rather than on that of hierarchical order. 
  
This is the complementarity of the network model, which Castells (1997: 356-59) notes involve 
variable and fractal non-Euclidian geometry of plural truths, as well as a dematerialized 
geography. 
  
Sociologically, networks can be understood as voluntary systems of negotiation, consultation and 
shared governance-well beyond the simple dyadic relation of the individual prerogative contract.  
(See, for example, Scharpf, 1997: 136-147.)  They are constellations of relationships for resource 
exchange and mutual support within a wide set of organizational actors. 
  
1.      trying to influence collective decision-making; and transactions 
2.      trying to stabilize trustworthy interactions, flows of information and transactions. 
  
Networks are at a level of modeling wherein one event can express itself simultaneously in 
different forms--wherein similarity is understood as iteration rather than sameness. 
  
Teubner (1999) – following Luhmann, McColluch and Gunther--refers to this complementarity 
of fragmented rationales/perspectives as polycontexturality.  He argues that private law cannot 
abdicate its responsibility to connect to these diverse rationales/perspectives and the new 
conflicts they engender.  And recognizing the need for a new form of the governance of social 
law, Teubner argues for a constitution of polycontextural law reflexively responsive to the 
collisions involved in this heterarchy of discourse specific norms.  Can private law take a 
partisan stance for the ―Other‖?  For the diverse colliding rationales polycontextural law 
recognizes and responds to this heterarchy--a mastery without a master, a society without a 
sovereign.  Over and above the late 20
th
 century recognition of a third generation of social rights 
to sustain and protect relations of diversity (i.e., multiculturalism), there is a fourth generation 
social rights to sustain and protect polycontextural complexity necessary for equitable 
information pooling and mutual monitoring in a global network society.  Polycontextural logic 
(PCL) helps us to institutionally design the procedures and communicative presuppositions for 
discursive deliberation in the context of fragmented/plural legal territories of relatively 
autonomous law. 
  
These third and fourth generation of social rights are supportive of action within group life, 
rather than of the recipient passivity of the protected individual.  They carry with them enabling 
associative potential rather than stabilizing entitlement allegiance.  They can create morally 
autonomous citizens rather than clients or footloose entrepreneurs without social obligations. 
  
Teubner sees the governance of social law, as a required polycontexturality addition to regimes 
of private law--a requirement to consider affecting institutional contextures.  And Sabel (1994a) 
sees such institutional design as transforming transactions into discussions by which parties 
come to reinterpret themselves and their relation to each other by continual joint deliberations.  
Through these, common understandings are articulated as reciprocally defining.  Plural 
communities are contextuated institutionally to regulate themselves in their interdiscursivity.  
They are connected to social bonding and self-binding elocutionary forces inherent in 
communicative reason, and in an evolving constitution of decentralized discourse rationality and 
autonomous law (Bohman, 1995: 241; and Alexy: 1989, 1993). 
  
The third and fourth generation social rights are discursive rights to diversity and complexity.  
They fit into an evolving theory of centrifugal legal pluralism.  They fit into a relationism 
articulated by Karl Mannheim in Ideology and Utopia some eighty years ago--one which accepts 
plural validity within multiple perspectives.  And they fit into the relationism of interdiscursivity 
and long term relational contracting we have described. But discourse, discourse-specific norms 
and procedures, as well as principles for critically evaluating discourse are not enough.  They 
must be linked to institutions, institutionalized practices, and institutional guarantees. 
  
Carl Schmitt saw the institutional guarantees of social rights as part of a fatal tension and stress-
fracturing of the Weimar Constitution the unbalance relation between its legitimizing and its 
integrative functions.  Precisely this is the tension between a foundationalist participation in the 
process of democratic will formation and the commitment to institutional devices to foster the 
social cooperation of dissenting political forces.  The pressure for state intervention to assure 
social integration undercut the assurance of democratic self-government, and substituted for the 
lack of development of a deeply articulated and autonomous civil society. 
  
 V. Institutionalizing the New Protocolism 
  
Charles Sabel in numerous articles over the past decade (1994; 1995a; 1995b; 1996; 2006) points 
to Social ―Learning by (Mutual) Monitoring‖ as a successor form of the governance of social 
law--a mode of coordinating decentralized chains of suppliers.  The goal is to rechannel diverse 
forces of globalization for the advancement of social ends that can constitute a transnational 
regime of labor and social performance standards.  It marks a form of protocolism for 
collaborative social learning: a protocalism of mutual monitoring and evaluating subcontractors 
that leads to continued reflection, analysis and democratic experimentation that further refines 
both the standards and the monitoring.  ―Protocolism‖ is a concept derived from the ―Protocol of 
Peace‖ that Louis Brandeis got mutual agreement to restrain chiseling in the New York garment 
trades in 1910.  It was a ―treaty of peace, a conflict-regulation regime of norms and internal trade 
governance laws.  It specified modes of arbitration and interpretation of the bargaining 
agreement.  This protocolism was extended by Morris Hillquit in the tripartite National Recovery 
Act Codes during the First New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt. 
  
In the movement from national laissez faire capitalist regimes to national organized capitalist 
regimes, protocolism emerged as both a voluntary system of code creation and constitutive 
contracts that configured collective negotiation orders.  The enduring trace of practice here is the 
law-creating capacity of autonomous associations either within or across nations--what can be 
referred to as the governance of social law beyond private commercial contracts.  Within such 
autonomous social law, private law is institutionally constrained to account for the colliding 
norms and discourses that contextuate  
associations engaged in transnational commerce. 
  
Where governments and transnational corporations have been slow to respond to environmental 
spoliation, and the suppression of rights of workers, children, and indigenous peoples, INGOs 
[international nongovernmental organizations] have taken the initiative to create institutions of 
monitoring, accountability, and compliance.  INGOs are subcontracting agencies involved in 
advocacy, service and mutual benefit activities in transnational settings, often for those who lack 
a voice in the globalizing market and its political economy.  INGOs play a critical new role in 
constructing a voluntary system of code creation that develops, maintains and sustains 
cosmopolitan social standards, possibly linked to the benchmarking protocols of the International 
Standards Organization (ISO)., and as lex mercatoria  and lex digitalis/electronica (Teubner, 
2007). These are networks of transnational voluntarism. Some INGOs and trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) – like Nike, Reebok, and Mattel – have voluntarily agreed upon codes of 
conduct regarding labor standards and social performance audits for their subcontractors in lesser 
developed countries. These voluntary code authorities provide baseline self-regulation and 
disciplined self-monitoring in the manner of National Recovery Act compulsory code setting 
discussed above.   INGOs take advantage of newly rescaled supra-national spaces, in arguing for 
new forms of multi-level/multi-layered governance. Their legal activism contributes to 
―tightening up the stitches in the legal net‖ (Cassesse, 1990), and in generating a network of 
autonomous institutions for standards and signals of reflexive governance (Benhabib, 2006; 
Teubner, 2007) which is discussed just below in the next section. 
  
In the regime of globalized capitalism, a new form of protocolism has emerged, instituted less by 
labor unions and corporations and more by INGOs: e.g., codes of transparency in conduct and 
procedure; social performance audits; and learning by monitoring practices.  This protocolism 
reveals an emergentism of a cosmopolitan governance of social law--one whch complements and 
corrects the notion that multipartite governance winds up in vertical concertation and the 
subversion of the rule of law.  We find that the democratic experimentalism of INGO 
protocolism actually advances diversity of governance, hierarchy rather than hetarchy, 
institutional complementarity, and what Sabel and Gerstenberg refer to as ―directly deliberative 
polyarchy‖ and what Sabel, O‘Rourke and Fung [2000, 2001a, 2001b] refer to as ―ratcheting 
labor standards.‖ From a protocolism for organized capitalism in the early 20
th
 century, we 
approach a protocolism for global capitalism in the early 21
st
 century. 
  
Sabel suggests a system of ―benchmarking‖ rolling rule regulation of decentralized labor and 
social practices--benchmarking proceedings of decentralized learning creating pragmatic 
protocols for obligations within networks.  These benchmarked norms and laws are 
incrementally ―bootstrapped‖ into a more enveloping transnational regime of social law.  
Subnational units of governance can set social performance standards and choose the means to 
attain them.  Regional and national coordinating bodies require actors to share their knowledge 
with others confronting similar situations. 
  
Mutual monitoring and learning among the network participants is encouraged; and a sense of 
mutual and respective accountability is stimulated through the participation of citizens in 
decisions that affect them.  Sabel and Dorf (1998) give examples in the regulation of the 
environment; the regulation of nuclear power plants; the procurement procedures vis-à-vis 
sophisticated military hardware; child protection services; industrial toxins control; and 
community policing.  Each project of collaborative learning is a iteration within a network of 
joint inquiry that binds firms in the network together, so as to allow predictiveness in the 
evaluation of network structure and capabilities. 
  
Specifically, Sabel sets out the steps in ―Learning by Monitoring‘ social governance: 
  
1.      adopt voluntary codes of conduct for social performance standards; 
2.      set evaluation and monitoring protocols; 
3.      determine how to monitor compliance with such standards; 
4.      determine how to test and evaluate social performance; 
5.      set up a system of information pooling by participants within the network; 
6.      verify information pooling data for the network; 
7.      build a system of completing third party monitors from certified accounting and 
consulting firms to audit subcontractors to detect protocol/code violations; 
8.      use competitive pressures and learning opportunities to improve social performance; 
9.      institutionalize a schedule of sanctions through a superordinate regional, national or 
international body so as to guarantee that suppliers in the supply network do supply; 
10.  provide opportunities for interfirm and intrafirm reflection and recalibration of social 
performance; 
11.  determine how to set goals for improvement or modification of social performance; 
12.  use ―social labeling‖ to reward and shame scofflaws; and 
13.  utilize surprise inspections and follow-up inspections to keep firms serious about social 
performance. 
  
The primary moral duties of those who run firms is to obey the law and ensure that their 
employees do as well.  Trust relations are a key goal of the governance of social law.  And a 
sanctions schedule helps build a pattern of comparative advantage for compliance with social 
performance standards. 
  
On a global scale, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) directed by 1960s antiwar activist and 
former Carter administration ambassador Sam Brown has developed an Apparel Industry 
Partnership and a 1997 Workplace Code of Conduct and Principles of Monitoring.  The Ethical 
Trading Initiative (ETI) has organized training programs, tested models for inspecting 
verification standards and for selecting local stakeholder participants in the evaluation process.  
The United Nations has recently promulgated a Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations.  The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank can set up sanctions 
schedules.  And the International Labor Organization and the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions can set up monitoring and evaluation standards.  Social clauses can be written into 
trade agreements.  Other examples include the Global Reporting Initiative, the Ethical Trading 
Initiative, the Clean Clothes Campaign, the Workers Rights Consortium. These are a new 
generation of governance of social law issues.  As in Weimar these are complementary 
institutions at best, complementary to capitalist relations of property and contract, as were 
Betriebsrate/works councils.   
  
  
 
 
 VI.   Reflexive Law / Reflexive Governance  
  
The new protocolism focuses on standard-setting:  e.g., performance standards, quality standards, 
compatibility standards, interoperability standards, ratcheting labor standards, ecological 
standards.  Such autonomously constituted standards - - outside formal government rule-making 
- - is referred to as the self-enforcing reciprocity norms (SERN) characteristic of reflexive 
governance. 
  
The new protocolism reflects the multiplicity of autonomous social subsystem regimes of rules, 
standards, laws and logics.  It is a form of network self-regulation wherein one autonomous 
subsystem‘s reflexion with other subsystem constitutes the heterarchy of multi-level 
governance.  Such self-regulation is a communicative network of institutionalized practices 
rather than as a well-integrated system of social interaction with a sense of collective 
conscience.  Involved in such self-regulation is a context of procedural reflexivity built into 
subsystem sensors to monitor unintended consequences of planned policy strategies. 
  
Rather than regulating society by a comprehensive code of substantive norms, there emerges 
multiple sites of social ordering; each with its own distinctive rationality, each with capability of 
reflexive feedback.  (DeSchutter and Deakin, 2006).  It is a network institutionalism (NI) shaped 
;by the contexts these multiple sites are located in.  The state apparata limits itself to respecting 
the contextual proceduralism and rules of competence by which an autonomous social subsystem 
regulated itself (e.g., in the workplace, in the corporation, in the profession, in the inter-linked 
network). 
For Philip Selznick (1969), reflexive law goes beyond the social law constituted in collective 
bargaining, but stops short of compulsory state interventionism.  Kettler (1987:75) noted how 
Selznick sough to stretch the concept of autonomous social law to one of reflexive governance. 
Selznick looked to the evolution of self-regulating institutions of conflict regulation in industrial 
and labor relations, where proceduralist formalism as contextualization would provide a context 
for participatory rule-making.  Like his mentor Robert K. Merton, Selznick saw these institutions 
in a middle range conception between generality and specificity.  Reflexive law represents 
negotiation protocols.  The mutual understandings by which actors engage in practical situations 
within the social space/civil spheres they share. 
Guenther Teunber saw reflexive law as broader than negotiation protocols within bargaining 
regimes.  He saw reflexive law as an expansion of autonomous social law in a way that opens up 
the network governance/argumentative networks Ansell (2006) recently describes. 
Teubner describes reflexive law as a new evolutionary stage wherein the law of a particular 
subsystem realizes its limits with respect to the legal culture and bench-marking by another 
subsystem.  Reflexivity is understood as subsystemic self-referentiality.  Each subsystem is 
autonomous in its being operatively closed, but is polycontextural in its being cognitively open. 
Reflexive governance has come to refer to the self-regulation of each autonomous social 
subsystem, each horizontal network of civil society associational governance - - beyond the 
initial labor law perspective.  Where the networks resist tendencies toward centralization, spawn 
a bewildering range of incompatible discourses, norms and rules as well as a range of ad hoc 
dances and collisions between subsystems.  As an effect of their interaction, these autonomous 
social systems transform each other heterarchically across multiple levels of governance and 
between jurisdictions. 
Reflexive governance is understood as a self-critical effort by network participants to use legal 
norms, procedures and sanctions to frame and to steer the self-regulation process in a procedural 
horizontal rather than in a vertical substantial normative setting (Smismans, 2004a, 2004b; 
LeNoble and Maesschalck, 2003; Hendriks and Grin, 2006).  A self-critical proceduralist mode 
of governance to go with a critical sociology of law and associations.  First order reflexivity 
involves the mutuality of interdependency and interpretation, especially with respect to the 
unintended  consequences/externalities of modernization (Beck, 1994: ch.1).  Second order 
reflexivity involves self-conscious/self-critical reflection on the process of modernity itself, as 
well as the instrumental rationality in modernity‘s functional differentiation.  
The French Regulation School, that the work of Robert Boyer (e.g., 2005) represents, focuses on 
the capacity of a market economy to respond to social partner differentiation and negotiated 
regimes of reflexive governance.  What is stressed is the viability of an institutional form in its 
conjunction with the existence of several other institutional forms.  What is studies is the extent 
such conjunction ―offers greater resilience and possibly better performance compared to 
alternative (institutional) configurations.  Boyer (2005: 67) refers to this phenomena as the 
institutional complementarity hypothesis: one which is rooted in the critical sociology of law and 
associations, and which characterizes emergent regimes of reflexive governance.  
  
  
  
 VII.   Complementary Institutions / Institutional Complementarity 
  
  
Institutional complementarity is the term that game theorists and economists like Jenna Bednar 
(2005) and Bruno Amable (2003, 2005a, 2005b) refer the way in which specified institutional 
patterns effect institutional influences on specified other institutions.  This is critical in the 
emerging heterarchies and networks of our socio-economic and legal context. 
  
The institutional complementarity of heterarchical or network society is seen by Castells as the 
new institutional practices/structures and successor modes of social partnership beyond the 
complementary institutions jerry-rigged to support the 1930s New Deal in the US or the 1970s 
neocorporatist Social Contract in Western Europe. The governance of social law is understood 
heterarchically, and not according to hierarchical principal-agent accountability and sovereignty 
(Sabel and Simon, 2006).The institutional complementarity necessary for the emerging network 
society Castells describes requires ―structural coupling‖ (his words) of autonomous subsystem 
regimes of standard-setting social law with other differentiated autonomous social subsystems of 
relational contracts and connecting multilateral contracts within the internal governance that the 
relational contracts constitute. These are autonomous subsystems of self-regulation -- institutions 
of internal network self-regulation . 
   
Complementarity can be understood as the manner in which components of a whole compensate 
for each other‘s deficiencies, contradictions and colliding discourses in constituting the whole.  It 
can be understood as a production regime.  With regard to autonomous social law, it can be 
understood as a production regime regulated by polycontextural social recognitions and social 
regulations.  Robert Boyer in (Amable in Crouch, 2005b: 368) uses the terminology of Teubner 
and Castells: using the concept of hybridization to describe the process of how colliding 
subsystem regime logics transform each other heterarchically 
  
The near future portends more networked governance and networked deliberative decision-
making/problem-solving (Castells 1996, 1997, 2004, 2005; cf. Latour, 2005).  Such networked 
governance amounts to law; standard setting, and protocols: e.g., monitoring transparency 
subsystems (Fung, et. al.,2004) such as monitoring multinational financial reporting, nutrition 
labeling, pollution reporting, safety rules, school standards.  Networks of autonomous social law 
will be assembled as enduring relational going concerns defined by nodes interactions, and 
governed conflict regulation.  The networks will be self-renewing if they are to persist.  They 
will amount to autonomous social law beyond the law of private transactions and public law 
promulgated by state executives, legislatures and courts. 
  
Following the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu [1992, 2000] rather than the more symbolic one of 
Niklas Luhmann, we have argued that autonomous / autopoietic subsystems of law have emerged 
over the past century as both active discourse and material practice.  They have operated not as 
mere theorizing or rhetoric, but as juridical fields of negotiated protocols with self-sustaining 
values and solidarism, with legitimated logics of appropriateness, and with a degree of 
calculability regarding claims and counterclaims.  
  
These are collaborative subsystems capable of enlisting self-regulatory stakeholders in problem-
so living, standard setting, mutually guaranteed compliance and sanction-backed enforcement.  
They are characterized by discursive standards, argumentative claims, bounded rationality, and 
institutional guarantees of mutual social responsibility.  Subsystems of autonomous law are 
compliance maintenance regimes based on bounded rationality of relatively enduring mutually 
reinforcing relations. 
  
Autonomous social law emerges in the wake of the transcendence of traditional notions of 
individual prerogative contract and organization based on hierarchy.  These autopoietic 
subsystems are not jus ad hoc intermediary holding operations, they are networks of mutual 
interests with generalized reciprocity relations beyond short term opportunism.  They are 
characterized by diffuse moral obligations based on fairness rather than self-interest.  Legal 
categories such as ―reliance‖ and ―good faith‖ become increasingly characterized by 
institutionalist agents and interlocutors, rather than individualist ones.  Autopoietic social 
systems emerge around increasingly recursive legal operations, wherein interactions become 
increasingly distinct and differentiated from other systemic/subsystemic interactions in the socio-
economic environment. 
  
 Teubner, like Castells and Latour, stress the increased emergence of simultaneously 
heterarchical and overarching relations within networks: how these networks are defined neither 
by foundational act of associational contract, membership or pooling of resources.  These 
networks resist tendencies toward centralization; and range from loosely organized decentralized 
nets with multiple serial nodes, to those handling franchise contracts to nets with fully 
collectivized liability.  Most are of mixed or hybrid character, spawning a bewildering range of 
legal obligation and liability patterns; as well as modes of interweaving of interweaving of 
incompatible norms, laws and discourses. 
  
Our paper‘s  focus on retrieving and extending the vital undercurrent in labor law--we identify as 
the governance of social law--enables us to rethink social democracy heterarchically rather than 
through vertical statist concertation.  This focus also generates further research questions for 
economic and political sociology.   
  
 How do these networks of negotiated social protocols act as complementary institutions, 
rather than as just interlocking institutions?  
 How do these emergent hybrid networks coordinate discourse among economic elites, 
state agents, policy elites, advocacy coalitions, social movements and epistemic 
communities.  (Cf. the Open Method of Coordination [OMC] in EU Social Policy.)  
 To what extent do participating INGOs act as autonomous social subjects, or to what 
extent are they tied to transnational corporations and foundations that fund them in 
promoting global and society relations of contract, property, liability and the rule of law?  
(E.g. Harvard-based Civicus, World Bank, United Nations Development Program, 
Carnegie Private Agencies Acting Together; Bristol-Meyers-Squibb.)  
 To what extent are the travel expenses of participants of INGOs at the World Social 
Federation funded by these transnational corporations and foundations?  
  
Given the structural separation of corporate ownership and control from corporate ownership and 
control from direct producers and consumers, there is the ever possibility of incentives for fully 
maximizing profit regardless of social conscience, operating with guile.  What factors would 
ever get a transnational corporation to act in socially responsible manner at even the most 
minimal level?  Following a suggestive economic sociology paper by John Campbell (2005), let 
us list a number of necessary practices. 
  
 Operating in a relatively unhealthy economic environment limiting the possibility for 
near term profitability;  
 Operating in an environment where regulations and enforcement capacities are based on 
ongoing extant practices of negotiation between corporations, the State, unions, NGOs 
and other relevant stakeholders;  
 Operating in an environment where there is the perceived system of well-organized and 
effective industrial self-regulation, supported by the State;  
 Operating in an environment where INGOs, social movement organizations, professional 
societies, advocacy coalitions, institutional investors and the press monitor their behavior;  
 Belonging to labor, trade or employers associations and in regular institutional connexion 
with business schools and publications promoting socially responsible corporate 
behavior; and  
 Engaging in institutionalized dialogue with all the actors mentioned in the two previous 
bulleted items.  
  
Finally, we reach the further research queries enabling us to approach a theory of institutional 
complementarity in these subsystems of autonomous social law (Bednar, 2004; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990). 
  
 To what extent do subsystems of autonomous law have to build and utilize cartel-like 
―common pool resources (cf. Ostrom, 1990) to support sanctions?  
 Is there a target effort level of complementary adjustment and readjustment required from 
all contributing players in a range of cooperative to non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
games?  
 Is there a threshold where sanctioning mechanisms are triggered signaling a necessary 
precautionary comparison of punishment sanctions and the duration of such sanctions for 
non-compliant behavior by a participant in network mutual relations?  
 To what extent are these thresholds consistently monitored and enforced?  
 To what extent are multiple signals of lateral heterarchy more efficient the signal from 
vertical hierarchy?  
 Under what conditions will action and sanction by a combination of multiple institutional 
actors (e.g., in federalism) improve chances for sustained compliant conduct within a 
hybrid network of autonomous law?  
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